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I. INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom among West Virginia litigators has long held
that state circuit judges grant summary judgment only in exceptional
circumstances. Like major league baseball's strike zone, which every
umpire calls more conservatively than the official rules dictate, Rule
56,' as applied in West Virginia's courtrooms, often bears little resemblance to the Rule in text. West Virginia judges typically have taken a
fairly harsh view of summary judgment.
Circuit judges' reluctance to grant summary judgment is understandable. Judges who have done so generally have received little support from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which reviews summary judgment orders de novo.2 State appellate decisions
have dubbed summary judgment a disfavored mechanism 3 , and have
instructed that trial judges should view motions for summary judgment
with "caution"4 and "suspicion." 5 Faced with this formidable standard,
many state lawyers have surmised that Rule 56 is effectively dead in
West Virginia.

But this Article is by no means an epitaph for state-court summary
judgment in West Virginia. Three recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of Appeals confirm that Rule 56 not only has a pulse, but is
quite healthy. In Painter v. Peavy,6 Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.,'
and Jividen v. Law,8 the court restated and revised the state summary
judgment standard, encouraged circuit judges to grant Rule 56 motions
in appropriate cases, and demonstrated that it intends to uphold judges'
summary judgment orders when they are based on adequate grounds.
The decisions expressly adopted and applied United States Supreme

1. Throughout this Article, both W. VA. R. Civ. P. 56 and FED. R. Civ. P. 56 are
cited simply as "Rule 56." The state and federal rules are substantively identical.
2. E.g., Painter v. Peavy, 451 S.E.2d 755, 758 (W. Va. 1995).
3. E.g., Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 421 S.E.2d 247, 249 (W. Va. 1992).
4. E.g., Chamberlaine & Flowers, Inc. v. McBee, 356 S.E.2d 626, 628 (W. Va.
1987).
5. Logan Bank & Trust v. Letter Shop, Inc., 437 S.E.2d 271, 276 (W. Va. 1993).
6. 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1995).
7. 459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995).
8. 461 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 1995).
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Court precedent interpreting Rule 56 and resemble, in both substance
and effect, the trilogy of 1986 summary judgment opinions by that
Court which liberalized the federal summary judgment standard.9
This Article highlights for West Virginia's bar and bench this significant trend in state law. Analysis of the pros and cons of summary
judgment is beyond its scope. Included is a historical discussion of the
summary judgment standard in West Virginia, a cursory review of the
Celotex trilogy, a detailed analysis of Painter, Precision Coil, and
Jividen, and an examination of state judges' initial impressions of the
significance of the court's pronouncements on summary judgment.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF WEST VIRGINIA'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STANDARD

The Supreme Court of Appeals first addressed the summary judgment standard in Petros v. Kellas. ° The court recognized that West
Virginia Rule 56 "is practically identical" to the Federal Rule 56, and
cited federal caselaw in support of the proposition that it was:
[W]ell settled that to resist a motion for summary judgment the party
against whom it is made must present some evidence to indicate that the
facts are in dispute when the evidence of the moving party shows no disputed facts, and that the mere contention that the issue is disputable is not

sufficient."

9. See infra Part Im.
10. 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961).
11. Id. at 183 (citing Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 273 F.2d 572 (4th Cir.
1960); Zoby v. American Fidelity Co., 242 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1957)). The quotation was not
incorporated into the syllabus of the case, although two context specific syllabus points address summary judgment Syllabus Point 4 states, "When the material facts are undisputed
and only one inference may be drawn from them by reasonable minds the questions of
negligence and contributory negligence are questions of law for the court' Point 3, Syllabus,
Graham v. Crist, W. Va. [118 S.E.2d 420]." Petros, 122 S.E.2d at 178, Syl. Pt. 4. Syllabus
Point 6 states:
When the material facts established by the pleadings and other matters not
excluded but considered by the trial court, as disclosed by the record in a civil
action based on negligence, are undisputed and only one inference may be drawn
from them by reasonable minds the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk' are questions of law for the court, and if such facts establish
contributory negligence or assumption of risk by the plaintiff and there is no genu-
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The court, speaking through Judge Haymond, went on making a strong
statement opposing utilization of summary judgment:
Even in cases in which the trial judge is of the opinion that he should
direct a verdict for one or the other of the parties on the issues involved,
he should nevertheless ordinarily hear evidence and direct a verdict rather
than to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment.'

The court next visited the summary judgment standard in what is
easily the most cited authority on the standard in West Virginia jurisprudence, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.'3
Judge Haymond enunciated the following standards as part of the syllabus by the court:
3. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it
is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify application of the law.
4. If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact summary judgment should be granted but such judgment must be denied if there is a

genuine issue as to a material fact.
5. The question to be decided on a motion for summary judgment is
whether there is genuine issue of fact and not how that issue should be
determined.
6. A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact and any doubt as to the
existence
of such issue is resolved against the movant for such judg4
ment.

ine issue as to any material fact to be tried by a jury, the court should grant a
motion of the defendant for summary judgment of dismissal in his favor.
Id. at 178, Syl. Pt. 6.
12. Id. at 186 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Consolidated Underwriters, 227 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.
1955)). Although the quotation was not included as part of the syllabus, it later formed the
basis for Syllabus Point 1 of Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980),
which was authored by Justice Miller.
13. 133 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1963).
14. The court later rephrased Syllabus Point 6 of Aetna in Wheeling Kitchen Equip.
Co. v. R & R Sewing Ctr., Inc., 179 S.E.2d 587, 590 (W. Va. 1971) as follows: "On a
motion for summary judgment the court can not summarily try factual issues and may consider only facts which are not disputed or the dispute of which raises no substantial factual
issue."
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9. A motion by each of two parties for summary judgment does not
constitute a determination that there is no issue of fact to be tried; and
both motions should be denied if there is actually a genuine issue as to a
material fact. When both parties move for summary judgment each party
concedes only that there is no issue of fact with respect to his particular
motion.

To support its enunciation of the foregoing law, the court relied heavily on the federal rules treatise, Federal Practice and Procedure,5 then
edited by professors Barron and Holtzoff. As in Petros, the court's
textual analysis included language which limited summary judgment to
only the clearest cases:
A party is not entitled to summary judgment unless the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for
controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party can not prevail
under any circumstances. On a motion for summary judgment the court
can not summarily try factual issues and may consider only facts which
are not disputed or the dispute of which raises no substantial factual issue.
A motion for summary judgment must be denied if varying inferences
may be drawn from evidence accepted as true.16

The court next restricted the usage of summary judgment in negligence cases. In Syllabus Point 5 of Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 7 it
stated:
Questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence
pertaining to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though
undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions
from them.'8

15. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 133 S.E.2d at 777-78. The court undoubtedly also
benefited from the argument presented by two future justices, Honorable Thomas B. Miller
and Honorable Arthur M. Recht. Both future justices appeared on behalf of the appellee in
Aetna. Id. at 772.
16. Id. at 777 (citing 3 BARRON AND HOLiZOFF, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1234 (Rules Edition) [hereinafter BARRON AND HOLTZOFF]; Cameron v. Vancouver Plywood Corp., 266 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1959)).
17. 135 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1964).
18. The court also strongly defended the right of a party to have a jury, rather than a
judge, determine the facts of a case:
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In Syllabus Point 4 of Spangler v. Fisher,9 the court continued
to speak of summary judgment in restrictive terms, expressing that all
doubt regarding the existence of issues of material fact must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party:
A party who moves for summary judgment in his favor has the burden of showing that the action involves no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the
movant for such judgment, but the court should grant such motion if it
appears that there is no genuine issue of any material fact.2"

Over the next several years, the court refined the standard enunciated in Aetna.2 In Syllabus Points 3 and 4 of Haga v. King Coal
Chevrolet Co.,22 the court stated:
3. Upon motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, R.C.P. all
exhibits and affidavits and other matters submitted by both parties should
be considered by the court, and such motion can be granted only when it
is clear that no genuine issue of material fact is involved.23

The province of the jury as the trier of fact is fundamental in our system of jurisprudence. R.C.P.56, relating to summary judgment, does not create a right on the
part of the court lo invade the province of the jury, but on the contrary, the function of the jury as the trier of fact remains unimpaired by that rule.
Id. at 243.
19. 159 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1968).
20. The language regarding doubt as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact
articulated by Judge Calhoun in the syllabus of Spangler was taken directly from Beaver v.
Hitchcock, 153 S.E.2d 886, 889 (W. Va. 1967) (Caplan, J.). The language was not included
in the syllabus of Beaver.
21. Although the court enunciated several more syllabus points in regard to the summary judgment standards during the latter half of the 1960s, those syllabus points only restated or rephrased the Aetna language in immaterial ways. See, e.g., United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co. v. Eades, 144 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1965) (the court stated:
If the matters submitted to the trial court outside the pleadings under the provisions of Rule 56 R.C.P. contain an issue of fact which may be material in the
disposition of the case, it cannot be disposed of by summary judgment under Rule
56 R.C.P. and a trial on the merits should be held after proper pleadings are timely served under the provisions of Rule 12 R.C.P.).
Id at 705.
22. 150 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1966).
23. Syllabus Point 4 of Haga was restated in Syllabus Point 2 of First Nat'l Bank of
Gallipolis v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 153 S.E.2d 172, 174 (W. Va. 1967):
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4. A motion by both plaintiff and defendant for summary judgment
under Rule 56, R.C.P. does not constitute a determination that there is no
issue of fact to be tried and if a genuine issue of material fact is involved
both motions should be denied.24

In Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. HarfordAccident and
Indemnity Co., 5 the court expounded on the purpose of summary
judgment, going so far as to allow a trial court to grant summary judgment against the moving party even where no cross motions had been

filed. As stated in Syllabus Points 4-6:
4. As the purpose of the summary judgment proceeding is to expedite the disposition of the case a summary judgment may be rendered
against the party moving for judgment and in favor of the opposing party
even though such party has made no motion for judgment.
5. Upon a hearing on a motion of one of the parties for summary
judgment, after due notice, when it is found that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the adverse party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, the failure of such party to file a motion for summary
judgment does not preclude the entry of such judgment in his favor.
6. When it is found from the pleadings, depositions and admissions
on file, and the affidavits of any party, in a summary judgment proceeding
under Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, that a party
who has moved for summary judgment in his favor is not entitled to such
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, affidavits or
other evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accord Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 172 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1970) (syllabus of the
court). See also Wilkinson v. Searls, 184 S.E.2d 735, 737, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1971) ("A
motion for summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, exhibits and discovery
depositions upon which the motion is submitted for a decision disclose that the case involves no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party who made the motion is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Anderson v. Turner, 184 S.E.2d 304, 306, Syl.
Pt. 6 (W. Va. 1971) ("In considering and deciding questions arising in a civil action upon a
motion by the defendant for summary judgment for summary judgment the court may consider answers made by the plaintiffs to interrogatories propounded to them by the defendant.").
24. The court also restated Syllabus Point 3 of Aetna in Syllabus Point 2 of Haga,
stating:
2. If a genuine issue as to any material fact is raised in any action, a summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56, R.C.P. can not be granted.
150 S.E.2d at 600, Syl. Pt. 2.
25. 158 S.E.2d 212 (V. Va. 1967).
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judgment and that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a
summary judgment may be rendered against such party in such proceeding.

The court again addressed the purpose of summary judgment in
Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp.: "Summary Judgment strikes at the
heart of a claim. It is a device designed to effect a prompt disposition
of controversies on their merits without resort to a lengthy trial, if in
essence there is no real dispute as to salient facts or if only a question
of law is involved." 6 The court went on to express the burden placed
upon the moving party as follows: "A movant is entitled to summary
judgment where the facts established show a right to judgment with
such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances."27
In Syllabus Point 2 of Howard's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Patton,28
the court explained that motions for summary judgment must be considered on a case-by-case basis:
Inasmuch as a motion for summary judgment will be refused if the matters before the court reveal that there is a genuine issue as to any material
fact, it is essential that each case wherein such motion is made be considered on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

In 1973, the court took a less restrictive view of summary judgment. In Brady v. Reiner,29 the court affirmed a motion for summary
judgment, stating:
The lower court and this Court on review cannot conjure 'if and maybes'
into controverted facts when they are not presented in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment ....

Rule 56(c), W. Va. R C. P. provides

for a speedy determination of legal issues when the developed record discloses no genuine issue of material fact. Consonant with the spirit of the
26. 172 S.E.2d 816, 817 (W. Va. 1970).
27. Id. at 813 (citing Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 158 S.E.2d 212 (W. Va. 1967); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co.,
133 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1963); Petros v. Kellas, 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961); Phoenix
Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967); Fred Johnson Cement Block Co. v. Waylite Co., 182 F. Supp. 914 (D. Minn. 1960); 3 BARRON AND
HOLTZOFF, supra note 16, § 1234, at 132; Lugar and Silverstein, W.Va. Rules, p. 436).
28. 195 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1973).
29. 198 S.E.2d 812, 824 (W. Va. 1973).
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rule, this Court has previously held, upon ample supporting authority, that
to successfully resist a motion for summary judgment, the party against
whom it is made must present some evidence to indicate to the court that
facts are in dispute, when the moving party's evidence shows no disputed
facts. The mere contention that issues are disputable is not sufficient to
deter the trial court from the award of summary judgment.3

Brady appears to be the first case to discuss the burden of the nonmovant to resist a summary judgment motion. The court again exam-

ined the resisting party's burden in Syllabus Point 2, Guthrie v. The
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.:
Under the provisions of Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, when the moving party presents depositions, interrogatories, affidavits or otherwise indicates there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, the resisting party to avoid summary
judgment must present some
3
evidence that the facts are in dispute. '

Nonetheless, the court again adopted restrictive language only two
years later, denying summary judgment in Burns v. Cities Service

Co. :32
The burden, of course, was upon.., the movant, to show no genuine
issue of fact, and any doubt as to the existence of such issue would have
been resolved against it ....
Facts favorable to the party against whom
the motion is sought must be resolved in his favor and he is entitled to
every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the pertinent facts
and circumstances.33
After the 1976 elections, the membership of the court changed
dramatically, and along with that change came a definitively restrictive
articulation of the summary judgment standard. For example, in

30. Id (citing Petros v. Kellas, 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961)). Although the foregoing was not made part of the syllabus of the court, the court essentially adopted the same
tone in Guthrie, 208 S.E.2d at 61, Syl. Pt. 3, where it stated that "[s]ummary judgment can
not be defeated on the basis of factual assertions contained in the brief of the party opposing a motion for such judgment."
31. 208 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1975).
32. 217 S.E.2d 56, 59 (W. Va. 1975).
33. Id (citing Tow v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. W. Va.
1961), affd, 305 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1962); Wheeling Kitchen, 179 S.E.2d at 587; Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 133 S.E.2d at 770).
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Cremeans v. Maynard, Justice McGraw stressed summary judgment
should be granted "[o]nly in those rare cases where the evidence con-

clusively shows lack of authority and where conflicting inferences
cannot be drawn . .
, 14 In Masinter v. WEBCO Co.," Justice Miller took a very restrictive view of summary judgment when he wrote,
"we have viewed summary judgment with suspicion and have evolved
the rule that, on appeal, the facts must be construed in a light most
favorable to the losing party."36 Moreover, as in cases of negligence,
the court limited the use of summary judgment where motive and intent were issues in the case, stating: "summary judgment should not be

utilized in complex cases, particularly where issues of motive and intent are present."37 And in Syllabus Point 3 of Thomas v. Goodwin,
Justice Caplan wrote, "On a motion for summary judgment the court

cannot summarily try factual issues and may consider only facts which
are not disputed or the dispute of which raises no substantial factual

issue."' Justice McHugh continued this line of reasoning in Lengyel

34. 246 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1978).
35. 262 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1980).
36. Id. (citing Gavitt v. Swiger, 248 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1978); Johnson v. Junior
Pocahontas Coal Co., 234 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1977); Oakes v. Monongahela Power Co.,
207 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1974); Hines v. Hoover, 192 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 1972); State ex
rel. Payne v. Mitchell, 164 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1968)). This suspicious view of summary
judgment was reiterated by Justice Brotherton in Logan Bank & Trust Co. v. Letter Shop,
Inc., 437 S.E.2d 271, 276 (W. Va. 1993).
37. The court went on to explain:
In complex cases, the tendency on a summary judgment motion is to rely on
the facts developed through discovery as constituting all of the relevant facts in the
case. This may lead to inaccurate factual assessment. A party may often undertake
very little discovery or limit the discovery to certain critical areas with knowledge
that he has the requisite proof available without the necessity of any further discovery. Frequently, discovery depositions of the parties or their key witnesses do
not reflect all relevant facts. This is because these depositions are taken by adverse
counsel and the deponents do not care to volunteer information and, therefore, they
give limited answers to the questions. While discovery procedures are useful to
develop the facts of a case, there is no requirement that all facts must be developed through discovery, and certainly no grounds for the assumption that they have
been developed by discovery.
Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 436.
38. 266 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1980).
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v. Lint,39 explicitly stating, "Summary judgment is, generally, viewed
with caution in this jurisdiction." Justice McHugh went on to explain:
The question on a motion for summary judgment is not ...

whether

the plaintiff has met the burden of proof on material aspects of his claim.
It is, rather, whether a material issue of fact exists on the basis of the
factual record developed to that date. The burden on a motion for summary judgment is not upon the nonmoving party to show that he has developed facts which would allow him to prevail if his case was submitted
to a jury. The burden is on the moving party to show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact in the case.4"
Finally, in Crain v. Lightner," the court seemed to reject the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v.
42 The Celotex Court had analyzed Rule 56 and enunciated a
Catrett.
summary judgment standard less restrictive than had been applied in
West Virginia. Writing for the Crain Court, Justice McHugh cited
approvingly from the dissent of Justice Brennan in Celotex, stating:
If there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a
reasonable inference in the nonmovant's favor may be drawn as to a material fact, the moving party is not entitled to summary judgment. In such a
case, there is a "genuine issue" as to material fact'
Most revealing, however, was the wholesale adoption of Justice
Brennan's analysis of burden shifting. In footnote 2 of Crain, the court
referred to the Celotex majority's discussion of Rule 56 as "sketchy,"
and refers to Justice Brennan's dissent as "a cogent and thorough explanation of the respective burdens of the movant and nonmovant under Rule 56."" After citing Justice Brennan's dissent with approval,

39. 280 S.E.2d 66, 70 (W. Va. 1981).
40. Id. at 71. The court also explained that "the use of summary judgment is
disfavored where development of the facts of a case is desirable so as to clarify the application of the law." Id. (citing Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 247 S.E.2d 712 (W.

Va. 1978)).
41. 364 S.E.2d 778 O(V. Va. 1987).
42. See infra Part III.
43. Crai, 364 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2).

44. Id. at 782 n.2.
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the court thoroughly analyzed the summary judgment standard articulated therein as follows:
[T]he burden is upon the party moving for summary judgment to show the
nonexistence of a "genuine issue" as to a material fact. This burden has
two distinct components: an initial burden of production, which may shift
to the nonmovant, and an ultimate burden of persuasion as to the nonexistence of a "genuine issue," which burden always remains on the movant.
If the burden of persuasion on the merits at trial would be on the
nonmovant, the movant may satisfy the burden of production under Rule
56 in either of two ways. First, the movant may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmovant's case. Second,
the movant may demonstrate to the trial court that the nonmovant has not
mustered evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmovant's
case. Where the movant adopts this second option, he or she may not simply make the conclusory assertion that the nonmovant has no evidence by
calling the court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record
that was overlooked or ignored by the movant. In that event, the movant
must attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of this evidence. Once the
movant attacks any record evidence which the nonmovant asserts is supporting, the burden of production shifts to the nonmovant, who must either
(1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the movant, (2) produce additional
evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial or (3) submit
an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in
Rule 56(f).
Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmovant fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmovant responds,
the court determines that the movant has shouldered his or her ultimate
burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial.45

The court continued its restrictive approach to motions for summary judgment in Gunn v. Hope Gas, Inc.,46 applying a similar stan-

dard of review as that applied to motions for judgment on the
pleadings: "the test for whether a motion for summary judgment should
be granted is essentially the same as the 'rather restrictive standard'

applied when ruling on motions for judgment on the pleadings.

'47

45. Id.
46. 402 S.E.2d 505, 508 (W. Va. 1991).
47. Id (citing Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Bauer, 332 S.E.2d 586, 588 (W. Va. 1985)).
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The restrictive approach to summary judgment continued through
at least the fall of 1993 when Justice Brotherton echoed the suspicious
language used by Justice Miller in Masinter v. WEBCO Co. in Logan
Bank & Trust Co. v. Letter Shop, Inc.48 Thus, until that time the
court firmly articulated a summary judgment standard more difficult to
overcome than that articulated by a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Celotex.

III. THE CELOTEx TRILOGY
Until 1986, federal courts generally were as reluctant to grant
summary judgment as West Virginia circuit courts. The United States
Supreme Court historically had taken a dim view of summary judgment, admonishing trial courts against "trial by affidavits" and frequently reversing summary judgment orders. In 1986, the court decided
a trilogy of cases which liberalized the summary judgment standard
and encouraged the use of Rule 56 in appropriate circumstances." 9
This so-called Celotex trilogy, named after the broadest of the three
cases, includes: Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,50 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,51 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 2
Each of the three cases reversed a court of appeals decision overturning a district court's grant of summary judgment.
The United States Supreme Court in the Celotex trilogy displayed
a novel, favorable attitude toward Rule 56, writing that, "Summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural

48. 437 S.E.2d 271, 276 (W. Va. 1993).
49. The Celotex trilogy has been analyzed extensively by several commentators, and is
discussed here only in overview. Readers who wish to further examine the Celotex trilogy
and its impact on federal summary judgment law would be well advised to begin with the
excellent survey of the cases by Steven A. Childress. Childress, A New Era for Summary
Judgments: Recent Shifis at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987). See also Kennedy,
Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the
Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv. LIG. 227 (1987); Risinger, Another Step in
the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to
Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35 (1988).
50. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
51. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
52. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' 53 "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that
allows it to accomplish this purpose."54
For the first time, the United States Supreme Court cast as equal
the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately
based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried by a jury, and
the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate
in the manner provided by Rule 56, prior to trial, that the claims and
defenses have no factual basis.5 The Court began to speak of summary judgment not in terms of disfavor, but rather in terms of the necessity that Rule 56 be employed in appropriate circumstances. Although
the Court claimed to be applying settled law in the Celotex trilogy, 6
the cases certainly altered the summary judgment standard and the
manner of district courts' application of Rule 56, and are now recognized as the cornerstones of modem federal summary judgment law.
The Court began its work on the summary judgment standard in
Matsushita, a case arising from complex antitrust litigation between
American and Japanese television manufacturers involving allegations
of price-fixing. 7 Focusing on whether the non-movant had met its
burden,5" the Court held that when the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(c), "its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."59 The
Court added:
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders
respondents' claim implausible - if the claim is one that simply makes

53.- Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Cv. P. 1).
54. Id. at 323-24.
55. Id. at 327.
56. E.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

57. Id at 577-78.
58. Issues involving the movant's burden had been resolved in the district court, and
were not at issue in the Supreme Court. Id. at 585 n.10.
59.

Id. at 586.
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no economic sense - respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."
The Matsushita decision made it clear that trial judges considering
motions for summary judgment should consider both the "persuasive-

ness" of evidence before trial, and the "plausibility" of the nonmovant's claim; the less reasonable the non-movant's claim, the more

persuasive evidence is necessary to preclude summary judgment. This
sort of qualitative review of evidence on a motion for summary judgment was new to federal summary judgment law.
In

Celotex, the Court outlined the parameters of the movant's

burden in accordance with the language of Rule 56. The Court had
held in 1970 that "[W]here the evidentiary matter in support of the

motion [for summary judgment] does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even ifno opposing
evidentiary matter is presented."6 But in Celotex, the Court held that

the moving party on a motion for summary judgment need not make
an affirmative evidentiary showing to be entitled to summary judgment.
Instead, the movant can simply "point out" to the district court that
there is no evidence in the record to support the non-movant's case. 2
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no
genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.6'
The Celotex Court noted that the moving party does bear an initial
burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 587.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-61 (1970).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 322-23.
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any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact."" However, the movant need not "negate" the non-

movant's claim. 5
Finally, in Anderson, the Court incorporated into the summary
judgment analysis the substantive burdens of proof associated with the
particular cause of action at issue. The Court held that only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law
("material" facts) can properly preclude summary judgment." Likewise, to preclude summary judgment, a factual dispute must be "genuine" - such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.67 The Court stated:
[In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the
evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. This
conclusion is mandated by the nature of this determination. The question
here is whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff
proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the
governing law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably find
for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the criteria governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the plaintiff or
the defendant: It makes no sense to say that a jury could reasonably find
for either party without some benchmark as to what standards govern its
deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall,
and these standards and boundaries are in fact provided by the applicable
evidentiary standards.68

Although the non-movant is entitled to reasonable inferences, the
Anderson Court held that "merely colorable" evidence which is "not
significantly probative" will not preclude summary judgment.69 A
"scintilla of evidence" in support of the non-movant's position will not
suffice; to defeat summary judgment, the non-movant must supply
evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in his or her favor.7°

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

I at 323 (citations omitted).
Id.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Id.
Id at 254-55.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 252.
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IV. THE PRECISION COIL TRILOGY
Governor Gaston Caperton appointed Justice Franklin D. Cleckley
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 1994 to fill the
seat vacated by Justice Thomas B. Miller's retirement from the court.
An esteemed practitioner, Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law at West
Virginia University College of Law, and author of authoritative treatises on West Virginia criminal procedure and evidence law, Justice
Cleckley appears to have brought to the bench a design to erase the
perceived stigma surrounding Rule 56 and move West Virginia's summary judgment jurisprudence into line with federal precedent. Of the
three pivotal summary judgment opinions issued by the court since his
appointment, Justice Cleckley has written two.
If Justice Cleckley was the catalyst for the court's new attitude
toward summary judgment, he has encountered no apparent resistance
from the court's other members. The court's decisions in Painter,Precision Coil, and Jividen were all unanimous.71 Surprisingly, Justice
Margaret Workman, who in years past had consistently voted with the
majority in decisions which appeared to discourage the use of summary
judgment,72 herself penned the resonant opinion in Jividen. Whatever
its motivation, the court clearly intended to send a message to West
Virginia judges and litigators through these three cases that, contrary to
popular belief, Rule 56 has not been judicially erased.

71. Although she concurred in the court's judgment, Justice Margaret Workman reserved the right to file a separate opinion in PrecisionCoil. As of this writing, she has not
done so. While it is impossible to deduce the aspect of the majority's opinion in Precision
Coil regarding which Justice Workman wished to write further, it is unlikely that she disagreed with the court's explication of the summary judgment standard, given her opinion in
Jividen. See infra Part IV.C.

72. See, e.g., Logan Bank & Trust, 437 S.E.2d at 276 (holding that summary judgment is "viewed with suspicion," and that even if the trial judge is of the opinion to direct
a verdict, "he should nonetheless ordinarily hear evidence and, upon a trial, direct a verdict
rather than to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment"); Sartin by and
through Sartin v. Evans, 414 S.E.2d 874, 876 (W. Va. 1991) (noting "[w]e have consistently
adopted a conservative stance toward summary judgment"); Gunn v. Hope Gas, Inc., 402
S.E.2d 505, 508 (W. Va. 1991) (labeling the test for whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted a "rather restrictive standard").
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A. An Inkling qf Innovation: Painter v. Peavy
The court's more favorable attitude toward summary judgment was
first manifested in Painter v. Peavy," one of the first published opinions authored by Justice Cleckley. The plaintiff in Painter appealed
from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Mercer County granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.74 The sole issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was appropriate."'
The facts of the Painter case were uncomplicated. The plaintiff
had been injured in an automobile accident and, through her attorney,
submitted medical bills totaling $708.60 to the defendant's insurer.76
The insurer sent the plaintiff a check for $750, conspicuously marked
"for full settlement of all claims."" The plaintiff cashed the check,
but wrote "[d]eposited under protest" beside her endorsement.78 The
circuit court held that despite plaintiffs "ineffectual" notation of protest on the check, the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction
when the plaintiff deposited the check.79 Finding no issue of fact in
the case requiring trial by jury, the circuit court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment."0
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company's check was clearly an offer for full satisfaction of a
disputed claim, and that plaintiffs retention and use of the check constituted an accord and satisfaction."
The court articulated
unremarkably the proper standard of review applicable to summary
judgment motions as it had repeatedly in the past, relying chiefly on
the Celotex trilogy.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

451
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994).
at 757.
at 758.
at 757.

at 757-58.
at 758.
at 759-60.
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But Painter stands apart from the court's earlier pronouncements
on summary judgment because of language the court placed in a footnote, declaring in essence that Rule 56 is still viable in West Virginia:
Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure plays an important
role in litigation in this State. It is "designed to effect a prompt disposition of controversies on their merits without resort to a lengthy trial," if in
essence there is no real dispute as to salient facts or if only a question of
law is involved. Oakes v. Monongahela Power Co., 158 W. Va. 18, 22,
207 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1974). Indeed, it is one of the few safeguards in
existence that prevents frivolous lawsuits that have survived a motion to
dismiss from being tried. Its principal purpose is to isolate and dispose of
meritless litigation. West Virginia Pride, Inc. v. Wood County, 811 F.
Supp. 1142 (S.D. W. Va. 1993). To the extent that our prior cases have
communicated a message that Rule 56 is not to be used, that message is
hereby modified. When a motion for summary judgment is mature for
consideration and is properly documented with such clarity as to leave no
room for controversy, the nonmoving party must take the initiative and by
affirmative evidence demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists. Otherwise, Rule 56 empowers the trial court to grant the motion.82

The undisputed and straightforward facts of the Painter case, along
with the court's dispositive recent pronouncement of the law of accord
and satisfaction, 3 made the case an easy one to resolve on appeal.
The propriety of summary judgment in defendant's favor was lucid.
Presumably, the court accepted review of Painter because the case
provided an ideal soap box from which it could broadcast the vitality
of Rule 56.

82. Id. at 758 n.5 (citing Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W. Va. 834, 172
S.E.2d 816 (1970)).
83. The court's decision in Charleston Urban Renewal Auth. v. Stanley, 346 S.E.2d
740 (W. Va. 1985), in crystalline manner supplied the law applicable in Painter.In Stanley,
the court wrote:
The creditor of an unliquidated claim must either accept or reject the debtor's
offer, he is not free unilaterally to modify the debtor's original offer and then
proceed to accept the offer so modified.
If a check is tendered bearing the words "payment in full" or some other
words of similar purport, the payee may either accept the check and acknowledge
the accord and satisfaction, or return the check to the payor. If the payee chooses
the latter course of action he may continue to dispute the underlying claim.
Stanley, 346 S.E.2d at 743.
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It is Rule 56's vitality - not its resurrection - which the court
proclaimed in Painter. In an understated characterization of Painter's
significance, the court wrote in Precision Coil8 4 that the Painter opinion was "not an innovation in our jurisprudence but . . . an application
of settled principles long recognized in this State.""5 The court is correct that Painter did not alter the precise legal standards to be employed by West Virginia trial and appellate judges entertaining or reviewing motions for summary judgment. However, the case did provide
the State's judges and litigators with the first indication that the court's
prior attitude of suspicion toward summary judgment" was softening.
The case sounded a signal to the bench and bar that the court had
placed summary judgment on its reform agenda. To that extent, Painter
was indeed an innovative decision.
The court did not speak loudly enough, however, if it intended its
Painter opinion to send a lasting message. In the second case of the
trilogy, the court attempted to make a bit more noise.
B. A More Definite Statement: Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.
Four months after it decided Painter, the court issued a second
opinion which echoed broader summary judgment principles in greater
detail and at greater volume. In Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.,7 the
court set out to clarify "the misunderstanding that may have been generated by the Painter decision," by "spell[ing] out with some specificity" the standards, governing summary judgment in West Virginia.88
Again, Justice Cleckley wrote for the court. The Precision Coil opinion
is the court's most significant pronouncement on summary judgment in
more than 30 years.
Although the court downplayed the significance of Painter by
describing the decision as no more than "an explication of the basic
principles undergirding Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at 335.
E.g., Logan Bank & Trust, 437 S.E.2d at 276; Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 435.
459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at 335.
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Procedure"89 and characterized the Precision Coil holding as "an application of settled principles long recognized in this State,"9 one sentence in Precision Coil provides a glimpse into the court's decisionmaking process and reveals that the court treated these decisions internally as more than a simple restatement of settled law. Said the court,
"We have undertaken a long and extensive reexamination of the Painter decision and reaffirm the principles it announced."'" This lone sentence, which stands without elaboration, does not expose the parameters
of the court's "long and extensive reexamination" and does not explain
why the reexamination was at all necessary if, as the court says, Painter did no more than repeat "settled principles long recognized" in West
Virginia. But it does confirm the court's rejuvenated interest in the
summary judgment standard and the manner in which West Virginia
circuit courts apply Rule 56 in practice.
The court's use of the Precision Coil case as a primer on the
West Virginia summary judgment standard likely surprised even the
parties to the case, who had devoted their briefing wholly to the substantive issues of employment law involved.92 The case concerned an
action by a former employee against his employer alleging that language in the employer's personnel manual had altered his status as an
at-will employee and formed an employment contract which the employer then breached by firing him.93 The circuit court of Harrison
County granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding as a matter of law that the employer had made no express contracts of employment in either its job application form or its personnel
manual.94 The Circuit Court held that neither the employer's job ap-

89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Brief of Appellant, Brief of Appellee Precision Coil, Inc., Williams
v. Precision Coil, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995) (No. 22493) (on file with authors).
93. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 334.
94. Id. at 334. Williams' initial complaint stated claims for handicap discrimination
and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. The circuit court
struck the latter claim for failing to state a viable cause of action. Id. When the employer
moved for summary judgment on the handicap discrimination claim, Williams moved to
amend his complaint to include the claim for breach of contract. Id. The employer opposed
the motion to amend, and moved in the alternative for summary judgment on the breach of
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plication nor its personnel manual contained the type of "'very
definite' promises of employment
sufficient to support a cause of
action under the 'implied-in-fact' contract theory, and, even if [the
materials] did contain such a promise, the disclaimer in the foreward
of the employee handbook prevent[ed] any statements from becoming
binding upon the defendant."" Labeling the propriety of the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment the only issue on appeal96 , the
Supreme Court held the circuit court had ruled correctly.
The court devoted more than half the length of its Precision Coil
opinion to a detailed explanation of the summary judgment standard.
What the Painter decision had said about summary judgment in passing, Precision Coil brought to the forefront, literally; the court began
its review of the summary judgment standard in Precision Coil by
reciting verbatim the summary judgment language which it had rele97 It then went a step further,
gated to a footnote in Painter.
stating in
plain language the essence of its holding:
To be clear, there is no need for a circuit court to wait until after evi-

dence has been received at trial when the standard we articulated in
Painter has been met and summary judgment is warranted. On the other
hand, and as suggested by Rule 56(c), this Court will reverse summary
judgment if we find, after reviewing the entire record, a genuine issue of

material fact exists or the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In cases of substantial doubt, the safer course of action is
to deny the motion and to proceed to trial.9

The court's instruction that circuit courts need not take a legally
insufficient case to trial and should deny summary judgment in cases
of substantial doubt, rather than where any doubt exists, departs from
the court's earlier holdings on the issue.99 The court recognized this
contract claim. Id. The circuit court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
on the handicap discrimination claim, holding that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie
case of handicap discrimination. Id. The court then granted plaintiff's motion to amend, but
awarded summary judgment for the defendant on the breach of contract claim. Id.
95. Id. at 334-35.
96. Id. at 335.
97.

Compare Painter,451 S.E.2d at 758 n.5 with Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 335.

98. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 335-36 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
99. E.g., Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 133 S.E.2d at 772, Syl. Pt. 6 (holding that
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disparity, but following the method employed by the United States
Supreme Court in the Celotex trilogy, the court endeavored to reconcile
rather than reverse its earlier holdings. Addressing its previous directive
that circuit courts should hear evidence even where the judge is inclined to direct a verdict, the court said, "[T]his recommendation is
proper in cases where there is doubt as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact, but we do not believe it was ever meant to be
[sic] override the explicit mandate of Rule 56(e). . . ."
Unquestionably, the drafters of Rule 56 contemplated that summary judgment would be readily available as a procedural device when used in
conjunction with the broad discovery afforded by the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure. If the nonmoving party does not controvert the proof
offered in support of the motion, and the moving party's affidavits show
facts that support a judgment as a matter of law, Rule 56(e) mandates
summary judgment be granted. The notion of a "genuine issue of material
fact" can refer only to an issue that properly can be submitted to a jury,
i.e., a trialworthy issue. If the nonmoving party cannot demonstrate any
reasonable chance of avoiding a directed verdict at trial, then there is
simply no justification for a trial and the motion for summary judgment
should be granted.'

As it had in Painter, the court in Precision Coil relied heavily on
federal precedent for support. The court made clear its intention to
bring West Virginia summary judgment law into conformity with federal law: "As a result of today's decision, there should be no doubt
that our interpretation of Rule 56 is consistent with that of the United
States Supreme Court."' 2 Drawing from federal precedent, the court
"any doubt" as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact precludes summary judgment);
accord Bums v. Cities Serv. Co., 217 S.E.2d 56, 59 (W. Va. 1975); Crain v. Lightner, 364
S.E.2d 778, 782 (W. Va. 1987). See also Logan Bank & Trust, 437 S.E.2d at 276; and
Masinter, 262 S.E.2d at 435, Syl. Pt. I (both holding, "Even if the trial judge is of the
opinion to direct a verdict, he should nevertheless ordinarily hear evidence and, upon a trial,
direct a verdict rather than try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment.").
100. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 335 n.7.
101. Id. at 335-36 n.7.
102. Id. at 335 n.6. This being the case, the court overstated the movant's burden on a
motion for summary judgment in Precision Coil. The court wrote that summary judgment
should be granted "[i]f the nonmoving party does not controvert the proof offered in support
of the motion, and the moving party's affidavits show facts that support a judgment as a
matter of law. . . . " Id. at 335-36 n.7 (emphasis added). Later, explaining the allocation of
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in Precision Coil imported into West Virginia law summary judgment
principles which had become commonplace in federal decisions since

1986 but had never before been articulated or applied in a West Virginia decision. The court abandoned the wary analysis it had applied
consistently to past grants of summary judgment and displayed a wholly new attitude encouraging the use of summary judgment in proper cases.

burdens on a motion for summary judgment, the court said, "If the moving party makes a
properly supported motion for summary judgment and can show by affirmative evidence that
there is no genuine issue of materialfact, the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving
party. . . . " Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The court later repeated this description of the
movant's burden. Jividen, 461 S.E.2d at 459.
In Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, the United States Supreme Court held that the moving
party on a motion for summary judgment need not make an affirmative evidentiary showing
in order to be entitled to summary judgment, but rather can discharge his or her burden by
"pointing out" to the district court that there is no evidence to support the non-movant's
case. "The import of [Rule 56(a)-(c)] is that, regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted
so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323. The moving party
does bear an initial burden of "informing the . . . court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)). But the moving
party need not "negate" the plaintiff's claim in order to prevail. Id.
In contrast, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to "go beyond the pleadings and
by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Id. at 324
(quoting Rule 56(e)).
This confusion likely results from the court's desire to demonstrate conformity with
its prior decisions. The court cites Crain, 364 S.E.2d at 782 n.2, which outlined the allocation of burdens under Rule 56, as described by Justice Brennan in his Celotex dissent.
477 U.S. at 329-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But even in this cited portion of Crain, which
described the majority's analysis in Celotex as "sketchy," the court recognized that a movant
could satisfy his/her burden of production on a motion for summary judgment by "affirmatively show[ing] the absence of evidence in the record by reviewing for the court the affidavits, if any, discovery materials, etc." Id. See also McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346
S.E.2d 788, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that a movant can meet his or her burden of
production on a motion for summary judgment by "present[ing] depositions, interrogatories,
affidavits or otherwise indicat[ing] there is no genuine issue as to any material fact") (emphasis added).
The court's characterization in PrecisionCoil and Jividen of the movant's burden on
a motion for summary judgment is inconsistent with its stated intention to adopt completely
United States Supreme Court summary judgment precedent, and clouds the burden movants
must bear to comply with Precision Coil's requirements.
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The court spoke in strong, lucid language. It held that where the
party opposing a motion for summary judgment fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of his
or her case on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial,
"Rule 56(e) mandates the entry of a summary judgment ... ,"1o3 It
noted that although a trial court considering a motion for- summary
judgment must view inferences from the underlying facts in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, it should
consider only "reasonable inferences:"
[I]t is the province of the jury to resolve conflicting inferences from circumstantial evidence. Permissible inferences must still be within the range
of reasonable probability, however, and it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the necessary inference is so tenuous
that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture." We need not credit
purely conclusory allegations, indulge in speculation, or draw improbable
inferences."'

The court negated the ability of the non-movant to create unilaterally a genuine issue of material fact:
For example, when a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions during a deposition or in answers to interrogatories, he does not

create a trialworthy issue and defeat a motion for summary judgment by
filing an affidavit that clearly is contradictory, where the party does not
give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony has changed."

Neither, the court wrote, can the non-movant create a genuine
issue of material fact by "mere speculation or the building of one
inference upon another,""0 6 by making "self-serving assertions without
factual support in the record,"'
moving party is lying."'0 8

7

or "merely by asserting that the

103. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 336 n.9 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 337 n.10 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958)).
105. Id. at 337 n.12 (quoting 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2726, at 30-31 (2d ed. Supp. 1994)).
106. Id. at 338 n.14 (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985)).
107. Id. at 338 n.14 (quoting McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va.
1986)).
108. Id. at 338 n.14.
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Rather, Rule 56 requires a nonmoving party to produce specific facts that
cast doubt on a moving party's claims or raise significant issues of credibility. The noninoving party is required to make this showing because he
is the only one entitled to the benefit of all reasonable and justifiable
inferences when confronted with a motion for summary judgment. Inferences and opinions must be grounded on9 more than flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuition, or rumors.

If these unusual words favoring the use of Rule 56 were insufficient to cause West Virginia circuit judges to look upon summary
judgment with a kinder eye, the court provided one further note of
encouragement. In a footnote, the Precision Coil Court hinted that on
review of summary judgment orders, the court might award more
weight to trial judges' decisions than it had in the past. Noting that a
trial judge's order granting summary judgment engenders plenary review, giving the court power to examine the entire record, the court
wrote, "We may affirm a circuit court's decision on any adequate
ground even if it is other than the one on which the circuit court actually relied."' 1 0
The Precision Coil opinion does not clearly delineate the movant's
initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment."'
However the decision outlines definitively, and in conformance with
the language of Rule 56 and the Celotex trilogy, the burden borne by
the party opposing summary judgment. To defeat summary judgment,
the non-movant must offer evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to
find in his or her favor."' Although the non-movant is not required
to counter a motion for summary judgment with evidence in a form
that would be admissible at trial, he or she must demonstrate the ability to produce enough competent evidence at trial to enable a finding in
his or her favor.'
A mere "scintilla of evidence" will not

109. Id.
110. Id. at 336 n.8 (citing Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.2d 709 (11th Cir.

1995); Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994)).
111. See supra note 102.
112. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 337 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
113. Id. at 337-38 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Hoskins v. C&P Telephone Co.,

287 S.E.2d 513, 515 (W. Va. 1982)).
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suffice,"1 4 nor will evidence which is "conjectural," "problematic,"
"merely colorable," or "not significantly probative.".. 5 Instead, the
non-movant's evidence "must contradict the showing of the moving
party by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that, indeed, there is a
- one which involves a "genuine" issue of "matrialworthy issue"
6
fact."
terial"
Paralleling Anderson, the Precision Coil decision defined "material
fact" as one with the "capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation
under the applicable law.""' 7 The court debunked the misconception
that any factual dispute in a case precludes summary judgment:
[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
The essence of the inquiry the court must make is "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
whether
8
law."

A trial judge faced with deciding whether a party has met his or
her burden on a motion for summary judgment must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."".9 In other words, if a plaintiffs burden at trial would require
proof of his or her case by clear and convincing evidence, the trial
judge must analyze the evidence submitted on a motion for summary
judgment in context of that evidentiary standard.

114. Id. at 337.
115. Id. at 337-38.

116. Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Of course, the party opposing summary
judgment must have had sufficient opportunity through discovery to gather the evidence
necessary to avoid summary judgment, if it exists. The court held that "a continuance of a
summary judgment motion is mandatory upon a good faith showing by an affidavit that the
continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion." Id at
339; see W. VA. R. Ciw. P. 56(f) (providing a procedural mechanism for such a continuance). However, the court noted that failure by the non-movant to file an affidavit under
Rule 56(f) is sufficient ground to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate. Id (quoting Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1995);
Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1994)).
117. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 337 n.13. See Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248.
118. Id. at 338 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 251-52) (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 339 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254).
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Having confirmed in Painter that Rule 56 still has a beating heart,
and having repainted the Rule's portrait in Precision Coil, the court
needed an opportunity to parade Rule 56 in the flesh. It found the
appropriate occasion for doing so in the third case of the trilogy.
C. A Dog and Pony Show: Jividen v. Law
The final case of the trilogy, Jividen v. Law2 ' is significant for
two reasons. First, it demonstrates proper application of Rule 56 in a
case with a host of disputed facts, none of which rise to the requisite
level to defeat summary judgment. Second, the decision contains the
most explicit statements to date of the court's intent to liberalize the
summary judgment standard. The court used Jividen to aid trial judges
in properly analyzing factual disputes in context of Rule 56 and to
illustrate the point it made in Precision Coil that "'the mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.'.'
Jividen involved a wrongful death action by the estate of a man
who died after allegedly being kicked by a horse.'
The decedent
had purchased three cattle from a former personal care home in
Wellsburg, West Virginia." When the decedent visited the home to
collect his cattle, he was kicked and fatally injured by an unruly

120. 461 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 1995).
121. Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). In two
opinions by Justice Cleckley, decided after the Precision Coil trilogy, the court actually
seems to be taking this principle a step further. In Gentry v. Mangum, the court wrote, "In
general, summary judgment is proper only if, in the context of the motion and any oppo-

sition to it, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant demonstrates entitlement
to judgment as a matter of law." 466 S.E.2d 171, 178 (W. Va. 1995) (emphasis added).
And in Payne v. Weston, the court said, "Where the unresolved issues [in a case] are primarily legal rather [than] factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." 466 S.E.2d
161, 165 (W. Va. 1995) (emphasis added). It is doubtful the court intended the qualifiers in
these sentences to be taken to their logical extreme, which would permit summary judgment
in some cases where Rule 56's requirements are not met. Such an interpretation would
whisk West Virginia summary judgment law into territory uncharted by any court.
122. Jividen, 461 S.E.2d at 455.
123. Id. at 454-55.
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The horse, named Keno, belonged to the home's business
horse.'
and office manager and was corralled on land used jointly by the home
and a couple to whom the home had leased the land for farming.'25
Defendants in the
The accident occurred on this joint property.'
case included the home, its administrator, Keno's owner, and the couple who leased the home's land. 7
At the conclusion of discovery the defendants moved for summary
judgment, pointing to evidence in the record which indicated that Keno
had never demonstrated a propensity for violence before kicking the
decedent, and arguing that consequently, defendants could not have
reasonably foreseen the "uncharacteristic attack.' 2 Plaintiff countered
by submitting evidence which it contended created a genuine issue of
material fact concerning Keno's violent tendencies.
Apparently discounting the quality of the plaintiffs evidence, the
circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that
"[n]o evidence ... was found in the extensive discovery process ...
indicat[ing] that Keno was dangerous, vicious, or had any predisposition toward violent behavior.' 29 The plaintiff appealed, arguing the
trial judge had ignored or improperly resolved genuine issues of mate30
rial fact.'
Noting that only factual disputes that add up to "trialworthy" issues preclude summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeals presented a geometric definition of which issues are "trialworthy," and
which can be disregarded:
Roughly stated, a "genuine issue" is simply one half of a "trialworthy"
issue, and a genuine issue does not arise "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that

124. Id. at 455.
125. Id.
126. Id at 454-55 n.1.
127. Id. at 455. The plaintiff in Jividen first sued the lessors of the land where decedent was injured, then later filed a separate, virtually identical complaint against the home,
its administrator, and Keno's owner. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 455-56.
130. Id. at 456.
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party". . . . Stated another way, "[i]f the evidence favoring the nonmoving
party is 'merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative' a genuine

issue does not arise, and summary judgment is appropriate.
The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present where the nonmoving party can point to one or more disputed "material" facts. .

.

.A

material fact is one "that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the
litigation under the applicable law." . . . As stated in Anderson, "Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Finally, in
reviewing a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, we undertake a de
novo review and apply the same standard utilized below."

Besides providing workable definitions of the terms "genuine" and
"material" as they apply to factual disputes, these passages from
Jividen seem to mandate that a trial judge considering a motion for
summary judgment must examine not only the quantity of evidence
presented in opposition to summary judgment, but also the quality of
that evidence. Some "colorable" evidence in favor of the non-moving
party is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The judge must analyze whether the: evidence presented is significantly probative to be
entitled to consideration. This is consistent with Anderson, where the
United States Supreme Court commented that a trial judge "must bear
in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support
liability," and that to create a genuine issue of fact, opposing affidavits
must not be "of insufficient caliber or quantity" to allow a rational
jury to decide the issue.'
Jividen's definition of "material" fact incorporates the elements of
proof of the claim at issue. Only factual disputes which have some
bearing on the non-movant's ability to establish his or her claim under
the applicable legal standard are capable of precluding summary judgment. A court considering a motion for summary judgment must consider the non-movant's evidence in context of the legal framework at
issue and, presumably, in light of the proper allocation of burdens on
the claim.'33

131. Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted).
132. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
133. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
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The Jividen case was rife with factual disputes. The court disposed
of the bulk of them by attacking their materiality. The legal standard
applicable to the Jividen plaintiffs claims, which sounded in both strict
liability and negligence, required proof that Keno's owner or keeper
had actual or constructive knowledge of the horse's violent tendencies,
or that the owner or keeper could have reasonably and foreseeably anticipated the horse's violent conduct. The court readily dismissed as
immaterial all factual disputes unrelated to Keno's violent tendencies or
defendants' knowledge of them. Disputes the court cast aside as immaterial included all conflicts between the parties about how the accident
occurred and about the chain of events which led up to it.' The
court wrote:
Even assuming all of the above versions of facts in favor of the Appellant, they have virtually no bearing on the elements of proof that will
impact the outcome of this case. .

.

. [E]ven taken in the light most fa-

vorable to the Appellant, they simply do not have "the capacity to sway
the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." .

these disputes
135
judgment.

will "not be counted"

for purposes

. .

Accordingly,

of summary

Resolution of the remaining factual disputes, which dealt with the
alleged knowledge and conflicting statements of some of the defendants
concerning Keno's dangerous propensities, required the court to employ
a qualitative analysis. These disputes bore directly upon the applicable
legal standard the court had articulated and therefore were "material."
Evidence plaintiff presented in an effort to establish these factual disputes included:
* Statements by the lessees of the land where the incident occurred that
Keno "was a bit frisky[;]" 6
* A statement from one of the decedent's relatives declaring that one of
the lessees had said that Keno was a "rambunctious, wild colt[;]" 37and
* A statement by one of the
lessees that Keno preferred to "run and
138
play" rather than be "penned."'
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Jividen, 461 S.E.2d at 460.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id.
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The court concluded that this evidence merely portrayed Keno as
being generally unruly, and was insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability under either a strict liability or negligence standard.'39 It
stated:
[We] conclude that traits like rambunctiousness and friskiness are insufficient to impose strict liability. In our view, given the strict liability standard, the proof cited by the Appellant to avoid summary judgment is
"merely colorable" and not "significantly probative." .

.

.Accordingly, a

reasonable jury could not return a strict liability verdict in favor of the
Appellant.
We reach the same conclusion in regard to the Appellant's negligence
cause of action. While we have been traditionally reluctant to affirm a
grant of summary judgment in cases involving negligence, when one coalesces the proof here with the necessary elements of the cause of action,
summary judgment was appropriate. 4

Again assessing the overall weight of the evidence presented by
the plaintiff, the court labeled "terribly attenuated" plaintiffs assertion
that conflicts in defendants' statements in the record might lead a jury
to infer defendants were fabricating details of the incident, and this
might impact the weight awarded defendants' testimony by a jury.'41
While it conceded that "serious conflict in a movant's version of
events may thwart an otherwise suitable motion for summary judgment," the court compared the conflicting testimony cited by plaintiff
with the record as a whole and concluded that the proposed inference
"rests more on 'speculation and conjecture' rather than reason."' 42
The court similarly discredited a single-page expert affidavit plaintiff had submitted in opposition to summary judgment.'43 The affidavit simply listed a few of the facts in the case, then stated in
conclusory fashion that defendants "ought to have known" of Keno's
dangerous tendencies, and had "failed to exercise the reasonable care
required" to prevent the horse from injuring others. 44 The affidavit

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.

at 461.
(citations omitted).
at 460 n.13.
at 460 n.13 (citations omitted).
at 461-62.
at 462.
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failed to reveal any nexus between the few enumerated facts and the
expert's conclusion.'45 Citing federal precedent, the court held that an
expert's affidavit that is wholly conclusory and devoid of reasoning is
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.14 "Given the
perfunctory nature of the affidavit and the absence of any reasoned
basis for [the expert's] opinion, we cannot conclude that the circuit
14 7
court improperly disregarded it.'
It is significant that one of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in
Jividen sounded in negligence. The court had held in the past that
questions of scienter and ordinary care involve factual determinations
requiring jury determination.'48 The Jividen Court made clear that no
cause of action is uniquely shielded from summary judgment:
The mere fact that a particular cause of action contains elements which
typically raise a factual issue for jury determination ... does not automatically immunize the case from summary judgment. The plaintiff must
still discharge his or her burden under [Rule] 56(c) by demonstrating that

a legitimate
jury question, i.e. a genuine issue of material fact, is pres49
ent.

Although reduced to a footnote in the opinion, this statement was
clearly significant to the court; it comprises Jividen's first syllabus
50
point.1
In its general statements in Jividen regarding summary judgment,
the court revealed the goal underlying the Precision Coil trilogy:
[W]e clarified our view of summary disposition, in part, to disabuse liti-

gants and circuit courts of the erroneous notion that [Rule] 56 had ceased

145.
146.
981 F.2d
147.
148.
S.E. 473

Id.
Id. (citing M&M Medical Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc.,
160, 165 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 2962 (1993)).
Id.
E.g., Dawson v. Woodson, 376 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1988); Butts v. Houston, 86
(W. Va. 1915).

149. Jividen, 461 S.E.2d at 457 n.9.

150. In Precision Coil, the court wrote similarly that "[c]ourts take special care when
considering summary judgment in employment and discrimination cases because state of
mind, intent, and motives may be crucial elements. It does not mean that summary judgment
is never appropriate." Precision Coil, 459 S.E.2d at 338.
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to exist. . . . Rule 56 was incorporated into West Virginia civil practice
for good reason, and circuit courts should not hesitate to summarily dispose of litigation where the requirements of the Rule are satisfied.'

Noting the reluctance of federal courts to grant summary judgment
prior to the "liberalization of summary judgment practice and procedure" spawned by the Celotex trilogy, the court described a warning
sign posted by a New Orleans district judge which read, "No Spitting,
'
The court remarked that "[t]he same
No Summary Judgments."152
sign might just as recently have appeared in one of the many county
courthouses in West Virginia."'5
What some circuit courts have characterized as our disapproval of
summary judgment generally may have been communicated by certain of
our decisions which have stated, for instance, that "[s]ummary judgment is
not favored. .

. .

"

.

.

.In the future, however, circuit courts should not

be influenced by whether or not summary disposition is favored. Rather,
the appropriate inquiry is whether Rule 56, as interpreted by cases like
Painter and ['recision Coil] is satisfied ....If the requirements of the
Rule are met, summary disposition is appropriate.'3 4

V.

CIRCUIT JUDGES' INITIAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE MEANING AND

PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE PRECISION COIL TRILOGY

What the Precision Coil trilogy will mean for West Virginia litigators will be decided ultimately by the state's circuit judges. Results of
an early, informal survey'55 of circuit judges indicates the bench is

151. Jividen, 461 S.E.2d at 458-59.
.152. Id. at 459 n.11 (quoting Robert M. Bratton, Summary Judgment Practice in the
1990s: A New Day Has Begun - Hopefully, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 441, 455 (1991)).
153. Id. at 459 11.11.
154. Id. at 459 n.l1 (quoting Andrick, 421 S.E.2d at 249) (other citations omitted).
155. West Virginia Circuit Judge Survey (summer 1995) (unpublished survey, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Survey]. Questionnaires regarding the impact of Painter,Precision
Coil and their progeny were mailed to each of West Virginia's circuit judges. Thirty-one
judges responded. The survey was informal and unscientific; the authors do not purport that
the results definitively represent circuit judges' opinions about the impact of the Precision
Coil trilogy. The results do, however, give some initial indication of judges' thoughts about
these cases and on summary judgment generally, and provide some insightful commentary on
those topics. The survey forms contained five questions, four of which are addressed in the
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well aware of the court's new thinking about summary judgment. But
judges' comments also evidence a divergence of opinion about the
precise nature of the message the court intended to send to State judges and litigators and show some skepticism about whether the court
will apply the retooled summary judgment standard across the board.
Question one of the survey asked:
1.

In your opinion, are Painter, Precision Coil, and their progeny:

A.

A departure from prior precedent, in that they strongly encourage
circuit courts to increase the utilization of summary judgment;
B. Largely consistent with prior precedent and only slightly encourage
the increased utilization of summary judgment;
C.

Wholly consistent with prior precedent and effecting no appreciable

change in the current status of summary judgment jurisprudence; or
D.

Other?

The responses were as follows:
A:
B:

26 percent;
55 percent;

C:

0 percent;

D:
No Opinion:

16 percent; and
3 percent.

Not one of the judges responding to this first survey question gave
any weight to the court's repeated disclaimers in the Precision Coil
trilogy that the decisions represent no more than an application of
settled law. Rather, a quarter of the judges surveyed recognize the
decisions as a departure from prior precedent, and the vast majority of
responding judges (81 percent) characterize the decisions as at least
slightly encouraging the increased use of summary judgment.
Judges commenting on the first survey question showed some
frustration with the court's prior uncharitable view of summary judgment, and provided some insight into their impression of the of the
Precision Coil cases:

text A fifth question asking judges to rank the most significant effects of the Precision Coil
cases on their dockets yielded incalculable responses. Except for a few notable narrative
responses which are included in the text, the authors have disregarded this fifth question.
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This case placed some authority back to trial judges to consider granting
summary judgment. While a departure, I'm sure many will wait and see
who will be upheld on these decisions.'56
A return to rationality, providing courts and lawyers with some semblance
of consistency in their reliance on the language of the procedural rule."7
I do not think the substantive rules have changed to grant summary judgment. Only the procedure to look at the motions without summarily denying the same.' 8

The second question of the survey asked:
2.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Following Painter, Precision Coil, and their progeny, which of the
following changes have you experienced, if any, in regard to the
filing of Rule 56 motions by the defendant in pending civil cases:
Filing has increased dramatically;
Filing has increased slightly;
Filing has remained unchanged; orFiling has decreased?

Responses to the second question were as follows:
A:
B:
C:
D:
No opinion:

3
29
65
0
3

percent;
percent;
percent;
percent; and
percent.

Most judges indicate that the Precision Coil trilogy has affected

summary judgment filings by defendants in civil cases only slightly or
not at all. Only one responding judge has noticed a dramatic increase
in the filing of summary judgment motions. Several judges indicated
that not enough time has elapsed to allow them to evaluate the effect
of these cases on summary judgment filings. Another, noting that filings in his or her court have remained unchanged, quipped, "Attorneys
'
are still paid hourly."159

156.

Survey, supra note 155.

157. Id.
158. Id

159. Id
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A third question asked:
3.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Following Painter, Precision Coil, and their progeny, has your utilization of summary judgment as a case management tool or otherwise:
Increased dramatically;
Increased slightly;
Remained unchanged; or
Decreased?

The responses to the third question were as follows:
A:
B:
C:
D:
No opinion:

7
35
58
0
0

percent;
percent;
percent;
percent; and
percent.

Although most responding judges have not used Rule 56 more frequently as a result of the Precision Coil trilogy, a sizable minority (42
percent) said their use of summary judgment has increased at least
slightly since the decisions were handed down.
The final question of the survey asked:
4.

Assuming that you view Painter,Precision Coil, and their progeny as

A.

encouraging a more aggressive utilization of summary judgment,
which of the following best describes your opinion of these decisions:
Very positive and essentially amounting to a new case management
and docket control device;

B.

Somewhat positive from a case management standpoint, but could be

C.

Very negative and will likely result in misuse of Rule 56 to clear

abused as a docket control device;
dockets; or

D.

Other?

Responses to the final question were as follows:
A:

23 percent;

B:
C:

52 percent;
0 percent;

D:

16 percent; and

No opinion:

9 percent.

Most of the circuit judges who responded to the survey (75 percent) view the Precision Coil trilogy as at least somewhat positive.
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More than half indicated some concern that the cases could lead to
abuse of Rule 56 as a docket control device. No responding judges
labeled the decisions a negative development in the law.
One commenting judge rejected the assumption that Painter, Precision Coil, and their progeny encourage a more aggressive utilization
of summary judgment:
Such an assumption in my opinion would put justice in jeopardy. Courts
are created to afford parties a forum to litigate legal and factual matters.
If we are to use summary judgment as a means of docket control, what
happens to justice? 6'

Others rated the cases favorably:
A good and much-needed crystallization and clarification of existing law
reinforcing in the trial judges trust and confidence that where summary
judgment is properly done in trial court, then the Supreme Court will not
arbitrarily or capriciously reverse and remand the summary judgment. 6'
Now if the Court hadn't "rediscovered" an "inchoate right of
indemnification" in the Dunn.. case, I might be able to use SETTLEMENT as a "new case management tool!!!"' 63

Several judges penned on the survey forms notable general commentary about the Precision Coil cases:
This case (Painter)is being cited in almost all summary judgment motions
so it's clear that the Bar is well aware of the Court's new thinking on
summary judgment as a litigation tool.'"
These decisions go no further than the existing rule, and they, if followed
by the Court, will implement the rule. They are good decisions. There is a
real danger that a judge will misuse Rule 56 as a docket control device.
Docket control should be accomplished by entering a reasonable scheduling
order and sticking to it. That is the basis upon which the Supreme Court

160. Survey, supra note 155.

161. Id.
162. Dunn v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1995).
163.

Survey, supra note 155.

164. Id.
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of Rule 56 as docket control and
might be able to distinguish the abuse
65
the legitimate purpose of Rule 56.1
I think the most significant aspect will be that courts and counsel will
case prior to trial - ie. What is material? What are the
better analyze the
6
genuine issues?'
Better "justice" in case, and disposition upon the merits of the case quicker and cheaper in appropriate cases. 67
I don't believe these decisions should have any effect except in cases
where summary judgment is warranted. In cases of that nature, summary
judgment has always been available. Attorneys constantly file summary
judgment motions and have done so for years. I don't believe that these
have a major impact on the delivery of judicial
decisions will, or should,
6
services or justice.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Barring retreat by the court, the Precision Coil trilogy has the

potential to influence state-court litigation in West Virginia as sweepingly as the Celotex trilogy altered Rule 56 practice in federal courts.
As the court itself confessed in Jividen, the motivation behind the
opinions was to proclaim to the State's bench and bar that Rule 56 is
still on the books, a matter which had previously been ripe for debate.
Whether the decisions alter Rule 56 procedure and practice in West
Virginia depends largely on whether circuit judges take to heart the
message intended by the court, and whether the court itself follows
through by supporting circuit judges who grant summary judgment in
appropriate cases.
Despite the court's repeated disclaimers that it was merely applying settled law, the Precision Coil trilogy certainly interpreted Rule 56
in a manner novel to West Virginia jurisprudence. The cases introduced into the State a host of summary judgment concepts and standards which, although commonplace in recent federal decisions, had
not previously been articulated in any opinions of the Supreme Court

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of Appeals of West Virginia. The court's wholesale adoption of United
States Supreme Court summary judgment precedent itself changed the
standards applicable in West Virginia cases.
The one notable legal weakness of the cases is their failure to
articulate clearly the movant's burden on a motion for summary judgment. Although the court states its intention to hold consistently with
the Celotex trilogy, it appears nevertheless to preserve the weightier
burden on movants which had previously applied in West Virginia.
Although the Precision Coil cases embrace extended passages from
Celotex speaking generally in favor of summary judgment, they ignore
Celotex's precise holding, which recognizes the movant's burden as
exceedingly light. To complete its clarification of the summary judgment standard, the court will have to revisit this issue.
Perhaps more significant than any technical adjustments to the
summary judgment standard worked by the Precision Coil trilogy is the
plain shift in the court's attitude toward summary judgment. The court
has transformed its view from one suspicious of Rule 56 to one which
recognizes summary judgment's value and encourages its use in appropriate cases. It is this new outlook which is probably the most- significant aspect of these three cases. Whether West Virginia trial court
judges will share the court's revitalized perspective, and place in practice the standards articulated by the court, remains to be seen.
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